Reference

Worked example: Marlow Industrial Supply, from chosen strategy to a running programme

Part of the Execution Planning skill · loaded on demand from SKILL.md

Read this when you want to see the finished product end to end: a 7-S diagnosis with scores, a RAPID chart for the five decisions that mattered, two full initiative charters, the 90-day plan, and the cadence that ran it. Every number below is internally consistent; use it as the standard for what a client-ready plan looks like.

Contents

  1. The client and the chosen strategy
  2. Stage 1: what the strategy requires the organisation to do differently
  3. Stage 2: 7-S diagnosis with scores
  4. Stage 3: initiative portfolio and two charters
  5. Stage 4: RAPID chart for the five decisions that matter
  6. Stage 5: 90-day plan
  7. Stage 6: governance cadence and follow-through
  8. What the partner challenged before it went to the client

1. The client and the chosen strategy

Marlow Industrial Supply (MIS) is a mid-market industrial MRO distributor operating 34 branches across the US Midwest and Southeast. Revenue is 840 million dollars, gross margin 24.0 percent (201.6 million), operating expenses 143.6 million, EBITDA 58.0 million (6.9 percent). It has 1,900 employees, of whom 410 are outside or inside sales, and roughly 11,000 active customer accounts. Growth has been 2 to 3 percent a year for four years, below the market's 5 percent, and two national competitors have been winning MIS's largest plant accounts with vendor-managed inventory (VMI) and on-site services that MIS does not offer at scale.

The strategic-choice work concluded with this choice, recorded in the choice record:

Win as the integrated supply partner for the 400 largest industrial plants in our footprint (each with more than 250 thousand dollars of annual MRO spend), by offering vendor-managed inventory, on-site storeroom services and a single digital ordering layer; serve the remaining 10,600 accounts through e-commerce and inside sales at materially lower cost; fund the shift by consolidating the branch network from 34 to 26 locations.

The value-driver-modeling work sized the value at 46 million dollars of run-rate EBITDA by the end of year three, taking EBITDA from 58 to 104 million on revenue of roughly 1.0 billion:

DriverBaselineYear 3 targetEBITDA effect
Key-account share of wallet (400 accounts)310 million revenue, 18 percent share of wallet480 million revenue, 27 percent share+170 million revenue at 22 percent gross margin = 37.4 million gross profit, less 15.4 million incremental cost to serve (VMI staff, on-site) = +22.0 million
Cost to serve the long tail530 million revenue served from 34 branches; 71 percent of orders touched by a branch employee60 percent of long-tail orders through e-commerce; 26 branches+14.0 million (branch consolidation 9.5, order-handling labour 4.5)
Pricing discipline on the long tail38 percent of long-tail orders discounted below matrix, average 6.1 pointsBelow-matrix discounting under 12 percent of orders+10.0 million
Total58.0 million EBITDA104.0 million EBITDA+46.0 million

The CEO, Frank Delaney, has run MIS for eleven years and built it by acquiring family-owned branches and leaving them largely autonomous. The executive team is the CFO (Anita Rao), COO (Bill Kessler), VP Sales (Dana Whitfield), CIO (Marcus Lee) and CHRO (Susan Park). There is no chief commercial officer, no key-account organisation, and no pricing function.


2. Stage 1: what the strategy requires the organisation to do differently

Before diagnosing, the team wrote down the five behaviours the strategy assumes, because a 7-S diagnosis is only meaningful against a specific strategy:

  1. Key accounts are owned nationally, not by the branch nearest the plant. A plant in Toledo and its sister plant in Chattanooga get one contract, one price list and one account manager.
  2. MIS designs and runs customer storerooms. That requires inventory analytics, site-level process design, and people willing to work inside a customer's plant.
  3. Long-tail customers order online without talking to a branch. Branch staff stop touching 60 percent of the orders they touch today.
  4. Discounting below the price matrix is an exception that needs approval, not a branch manager's daily habit.
  5. Eight branches close or become spokes. Branch managers accept a hub-and-spoke role with narrower authority.

Each of these is a change in behaviour that the current organisation was built to prevent. That is the diagnosis's starting point.


3. Stage 2: 7-S diagnosis with scores

Scoring rule: each S is rated 1 to 5 on alignment with the chosen strategy, not on quality in the abstract. 5 means "already fully consistent with what the strategy requires"; 1 means "actively works against it". Evidence is required for every score. The diagnosis used 22 interviews (executive team, 8 branch managers, 6 sales reps, 3 key-account customers), the compensation plan, the monthly review deck, and the CEO's calendar for the last quarter.

SScoreEvidenceMisalignment with the strategy
Strategy4Choice record is explicit; executive team can repeat it. But no branch or region has a target derived from itNeeds translation into unit-level targets; otherwise it stays a head-office statement
Structure234 branch P&Ls; branch manager owns every customer in the territory, including the 400 key accounts; e-commerce is a project inside IT with no commercial owner; no pricing functionKey accounts have no national owner; digital has no revenue owner; nobody owns price
Systems2Branch manager bonus is 100 percent on branch gross profit; sales rep commission is on gross profit dollars with no matrix-adherence element; no CRM (customer data lives in the ERP and in reps' notebooks); pricing overrides are entered free-text in the ERP with no approval workflow; monthly review is 34 branch P&L pagesEvery system pays people to keep accounts in the branch and to discount to close the order
Shared values3"We know our customers by name" appears unprompted in 17 of 22 interviews; strong pride in local service; suspicion of "corporate programmes" from the acquired-branch eraLocal service pride supports the VMI offer (it is service-intensive) but resists national ownership and online migration
Skills2Three people in the company can design a site-level inventory programme (two in Ohio, one in Georgia); no inventory analytics capability; no e-commerce merchandising or digital marketing skill; strong product knowledge in the sales forceThe strategy's core capability exists in three people; digital skill is absent
Style2CEO's last quarter: 31 branch visits, 0 key-account customer visits; monthly review walks 34 branches in P&L order and names the top three branch managers; conflict between functions is settled by the CEO one-on-one, not in the room; decisions on discounts above 10 points routinely escalate to the CEOThe CEO's time and recognition reinforce the branch-centric model the strategy is replacing
Staff3Outside sales force is tenured (median 9 years) and technically strong; 13 of 34 branch managers are over 58; no key-account managers exist; VP Sales has run a branch-based organisation for 20 years and has not led a national-accounts modelThe people to run the new model are not in the seats; the sales force is an asset if redeployed

Alignment summary, stated as the partner wanted it stated:

The hard S's can be changed by decision within 90 days: create a key-account organisation, give digital a commercial owner, redesign the bonus, install a discount approval workflow. None of that will hold unless two soft S's move with it. Skills is the binding constraint on the VMI offer: with three qualified people MIS can run pilots, not 400 accounts, so the key-account ramp must be gated by a capability-building plan. Style is the binding constraint on everything else: if the CEO keeps reviewing 34 branch P&Ls and celebrating branch heroes, the incentive redesign will be read as a corporate programme and worked around. The first 90 days must therefore change the CEO's own review and calendar, not just the org chart.

Two soft-S levers were built into the plan as a direct consequence: the CEO's monthly review was redesigned around initiatives and key accounts (style), and the three inventory-programme experts were made the founding faculty of a VMI academy with a target of 24 trained site designers by month nine (skills).


4. Stage 3: initiative portfolio and two charters

The value at stake and the 7-S diagnosis produced five initiatives, plus the transformation office that runs them. Five is the limit the CEO could personally review each month; a sixth candidate (private-label expansion) was deferred to year two.

InitiativeOwnerSponsorYear 3 EBITDAMain 7-S levers
1. Key Account Programme (KAP)Head of Key Accounts (new role)Dana Whitfield, promoted to Chief Commercial Officer22.0 millionStructure, skills, systems
2. Digital channel migrationVP Digital (new role, external hire)Dana Whitfield4.5 million (order-handling labour); also enables initiative 3Structure, skills
3. Branch network reconfigurationBill Kessler, COOFrank Delaney, CEO9.5 millionStructure, staff
4. Pricing disciplineHead of Pricing (new role, internal from finance)Anita Rao, CFO10.0 millionSystems
5. Incentives and CRM (enabler)Susan Park, CHRO, with Marcus Lee, CIOFrank DelaneyEnabler for 1 to 4Systems, style
Transformation officeProgramme lead (internal, reports to CEO)Frank Delaneyn/aStyle, follow-through

Charter 1: Key Account Programme

FieldContent
InitiativeKey Account Programme (KAP)
OwnerHead of Key Accounts (to be appointed by day 30; interim: Dana Whitfield)
SponsorDana Whitfield, Chief Commercial Officer
ObjectiveMove MIS from 18 to 27 percent share of wallet across the 400 designated key accounts by offering VMI, on-site storeroom services and a single national contract
Value at stakeBaseline 310 million revenue at 18 percent share; target 480 million by end of year 3; EBITDA contribution 22.0 million run-rate. Year 1 target: 40 accounts under national contract, 15 live VMI sites, 28 million incremental revenue
Scope inThe 400 accounts on the designated list (decision D1); VMI and storeroom services; national contracts and pricing; key-account manager hiring and training; the VMI academy
Scope outLong-tail customers (initiative 2); private label (deferred); branch closures (initiative 3)
MilestonesDay 30: Head of Key Accounts appointed; 400-account list approved (D1). Day 60: first 12 key-account managers named (8 internal from outside sales, 4 external); VMI academy cohort 1 (8 people) starts. Day 90: 5 VMI pilot sites live (Toledo, Dayton, Chattanooga, Louisville, Birmingham); 10 national contracts signed. Month 6: 10 VMI sites; 24 contracts. Month 12: 15 VMI sites; 40 contracts; 28 million incremental revenue
Resources12 KAMs in year 1 (2.1 million loaded cost), 8 site designers trained (0.4 million training cost), 0.6 million VMI hardware and software for pilots; total year 1 opex 3.1 million, in the value model
DependenciesD1 (account list) and D3 (incentive redesign) must be decided by day 45 or account transfers will be resisted; CRM (initiative 5) needed by month 4 for pipeline visibility
Decisions requiredD1 account designation; D3 incentives; D4 discount authority for national contracts
MeasuresLead: contracts signed, VMI sites live, trained site designers, pipeline value. Lag: share of wallet, incremental revenue, key-account gross margin. Formal definitions in the kpi-architecture scorecard
Top risksBranch managers slow-walk account handover (mitigation: transition credit in the bonus plan for 12 months); VMI pilots fail on inventory accuracy (mitigation: site designers on site full-time for the first 8 weeks). Full pre-mortem run through a pre-mortem
Review cadenceWeekly initiative stand-up (owner, 30 minutes); fortnightly transformation office review; monthly CEO operating review

Charter 2: Branch network reconfiguration

FieldContent
InitiativeBranch network reconfiguration
OwnerBill Kessler, COO
SponsorFrank Delaney, CEO
ObjectiveMove from 34 stand-alone branches to a hub-and-spoke network of 26 locations (10 hubs, 16 spokes) without losing more than 2 percent of affected-branch revenue
Value at stake9.5 million run-rate EBITDA: 8 closures at 1.4 million average fully loaded branch cost (11.2 million), less 1.7 million of retained delivery and counter cost in the spokes. One-time cost 6.8 million (leases, severance, inventory transfer), in the value model. Year 1 target: 4 closures complete, 4.2 million run-rate saving
Scope inClosure list and sequencing (D2); lease exits; inventory consolidation; delivery route redesign; people plan for 96 affected employees; customer communication
Scope outKey-account service model (initiative 1); e-commerce (initiative 2); any acquisition
MilestonesDay 45: closure list and sequence approved (D2). Day 60: people plan for wave 1 (4 branches) agreed with CHRO; customer communication plan for wave 1 approved by CCO. Day 90: wave 1 lease notices served; delivery routes redesigned. Month 6: wave 1 closures complete. Month 12: wave 2 (4 branches) complete
ResourcesNetwork lead (internal, full time), real-estate counsel (external), 2 analysts from finance for 6 months
DependenciesD2 requires the KAP account list (D1), because 3 of the 8 candidate branches serve key-account plants and need a service plan before closure; CRM migration of customer records before each closure
Decisions requiredD2 closure list and sequence; wave-level severance terms (delegated to COO and CHRO within a budget approved with D2)
MeasuresLead: lease notices served, routes redesigned, employees redeployed or exited per plan. Lag: run-rate saving realised, affected-branch revenue retention (target at least 98 percent)
Top risksRevenue loss in closed branches exceeds 2 percent because customers follow departed staff to competitors (mitigation: retention bonuses for the 22 counter and delivery staff moving to hubs; customer calls by the CCO's team in the 30 days before each closure). Full pre-mortem run through a pre-mortem
Review cadenceWeekly initiative stand-up; fortnightly transformation office review; monthly CEO operating review

5. Stage 4: RAPID chart for the five decisions that matter

The team listed 23 decisions the programme would need in year one and charted the 5 that were both high-consequence and sitting on an organisational seam (centre versus branch, function versus function). The rest were delegated to initiative owners within their charters.

DecisionRAPIDDeadlineSlot in cadence
D1. Which 400 accounts are designated key accounts and transfer from branch to national ownershipHead of Key Accounts (interim: CCO)CFO (margin floor on national contracts)KAP team; branch managers (handover)34 branch managers; 2 regional VPs; Head of PricingCCODay 30Transformation office review, week 4
D2. Branch closure list and sequencingNetwork lead (COO's office)CCO (customer retention plan); CFO (one-time cost within 6.8 million)COO; CHRO8 affected branch managers; real-estate counsel; Head of Key AccountsCEODay 45Transformation office review, week 6
D3. Sales incentive redesign: from 100 percent branch gross profit to a blended plan with matrix adherence and account-transition creditCHRO with sales operationsCFO (cost neutrality); CCOHR; finance; payroll2 regional VPs; 20 top-quartile reps; Head of PricingCEODay 45Transformation office review, week 6
D4. Discount authority: who may price below the matrix, by how much, with what approvalHead of PricingCCOBranch managers; inside sales; KAP team2 regional VPs; Head of Key Accounts; 6 branch managersCFODay 60Transformation office review, week 8
D5. E-commerce platform selection and 6.5 million investmentVP Digital (interim: CIO)CFO (capital); CIO (architecture and security)IT; VP Digital's teamHead of Key Accounts; customer service lead; 10 pilot customersCEODay 75Transformation office review, week 10

Rules applied and the arguments they settled:

  • One D per decision. The CEO initially wanted D2 and D3 to be "executive team decisions". The chart names him as D and the relevant executives as A or I, so the closure list cannot be re-litigated after the meeting.
  • Few A's. Five functions asked for an A on D1; only the CFO kept it (a margin floor is a formal financial sign-off). The regional VPs were demoted to I, which they accepted once the difference between "consulted" and "veto" was explained.
  • D at the lowest level with the information. D4 sits with the CFO, not the CEO, because the CEO was the current bottleneck: discount escalations above 10 points were reaching him at a rate of 30 a month. D1 sits with the CCO because the account list is a commercial judgment, not a corporate one.
  • Every charted decision has a dated slot in the cadence. A RAPID chart without dates is a chart; with dates it is a plan.

6. Stage 5: 90-day plan

Structured in four blocks. Each line has an owner and a done-test, not an activity description.

WeeksInitiativeDeliverable and done-testOwner
1 to 2Transformation officeProgramme lead appointed; charters 1 to 5 signed by owner and sponsor; cadence calendar issued for 12 months; decision log opened with D1 to D5CEO; programme lead
1 to 2StyleCEO's monthly review redesigned: 60 minutes on the five initiatives, 30 on key accounts, 30 on network P&L by region (not by branch); first new-format review held in week 5CEO; programme lead
1 to 4KAP400-account list built from ERP spend data and rep input; margin floor modelled; D1 recommendation presented week 4 and decidedInterim Head of Key Accounts
1 to 4PricingDiscount-override data extracted from ERP (38 percent of orders, 6.1 points average confirmed); matrix rebuilt for top 2,000 SKUsHead of Pricing
3 to 6IncentivesBlended plan designed and modelled on last year's payroll (cost-neutral at plan; +8 percent at stretch); tested with 20 top reps; D3 recommendation week 6CHRO
3 to 6NetworkClosure candidate analysis for 12 branches (revenue overlap, drive time, lease terms, key-account exposure); D2 recommendation week 6Network lead
5 to 8KAPHead of Key Accounts appointed (day 30); 12 KAMs named (day 60); VMI academy cohort 1 starts (day 60) with the three existing experts as facultyCCO
5 to 8PricingApproval workflow configured in ERP (any override over 3 points routes to Head of Pricing, over 8 to CFO); D4 recommendation week 8Head of Pricing; CIO
7 to 10DigitalVendor shortlist of 3; 10 pilot customers interviewed on ordering behaviour; D5 recommendation week 10Interim VP Digital (CIO)
7 to 10NetworkWave 1 people plan (4 branches, 48 employees) agreed with CHRO; customer communication plan approved by CCOCOO; CHRO
9 to 13KAP5 VMI pilot sites live; 10 national contracts signed; pipeline of 60 accounts in CRM (interim CRM: structured spreadsheet until initiative 5 delivers)Head of Key Accounts
9 to 13Incentives and CRMNew plan communicated to all 410 sales staff by day 75, effective day 91; CRM vendor selected; data migration planCHRO; CIO
11 to 13NetworkWave 1 lease notices served; delivery routes redesigned and tested for 2 weeksCOO
13AllDay-90 review with the CEO: each initiative reports against its charter milestones; the value ledger shows committed versus realised; decisions D1 to D5 all closed or explicitly re-datedProgramme lead

Day-90 outcome, as it happened: D1 to D4 decided on schedule; D5 slipped two weeks because the CFO required a third vendor reference; 5 VMI pilots live with inventory accuracy at 96.8 percent against a 97 percent target; 9 national contracts signed (target 10); wave 1 lease notices served on all 4 branches. Run-rate value committed: 6.1 million of the 46 million, all in pricing and network; nothing realised yet in the P&L, as expected at day 90.


7. Stage 6: governance cadence and follow-through

ForumFrequency and lengthChair and attendeesPurpose and standing agendaWritten output
Initiative stand-upWeekly, 30 minutesInitiative owner; team leadsProgress against next milestone; blockers; asks of other initiativesBlocker list to programme lead same day
Transformation office reviewFortnightly, 90 minutesCEO chairs; 5 initiative owners, CFO, programme leadDecisions due this fortnight (from the RAPID chart) presented and closed; milestone status; cross-initiative dependencies; value ledgerDecision log entry and commitments note within 24 hours, from the programme lead, listing who does what by when
CEO operating reviewMonthly, 2 hoursCEO chairs; full executive team; initiative owners for their slot60 minutes initiatives (each owner: milestone, value, one problem needing help); 30 minutes key accounts (top 20 by pipeline); 30 minutes regional P&L versus operating planCommitments note within 24 hours; the next review opens with last month's commitments read aloud, with status
Strategy and people reviewQuarterly, half dayCEO chairs; executive team; CHRO leads the people halfAre the value-model assumptions still holding? Which of the 7-S scores has moved? Talent review of the 40 roles critical to the strategy; action on non-performersUpdated 7-S scores; people actions with dates; changes to charters logged
Board updateQuarterlyCEOValue ledger and milestones; in board-deck formatn/a

Follow-through rules the CEO adopted and the programme lead enforced:

  1. No meeting ends without a written list of decisions, commitments, owners and dates, circulated within 24 hours.
  2. Every review opens with the previous commitments. A missed commitment is re-dated in the room, with a reason; it does not silently roll.
  3. Status is reported against the charter milestone, not as a colour. "Green" is not a status; "5 of 5 pilot sites live, accuracy 96.8 versus 97 target" is.
  4. Each initiative owner brings one problem they need help with to every CEO review. An owner who reports no problems for two consecutive reviews is asked to explain why.
  5. The people process is linked to the initiatives: KAM and site-designer performance feeds the quarterly talent review, and the year-end bonus pool for the executive team is 40 percent on the value ledger.

8. What the partner challenged before it went to the client

  • "Your 7-S scores are opinions. Show me the evidence column." The team added interview counts, the calendar analysis and the compensation plan reference to every row.
  • "Structure and systems are both 2, and you propose to fix both in 90 days. What stops this from being another corporate programme the branches wait out?" This produced the style lever: redesigning the CEO's own review and calendar in weeks 1 to 2, before any org change was announced.
  • "Who has the D on the closure list? If the answer is 'the executive team', nobody does." Fixed in the RAPID chart.
  • "Fifteen VMI sites in year one with three trained people is not a plan, it is a hope." This produced the VMI academy milestone and the gating of the account ramp to trained capacity.
  • "Where is the risk register?" Deliberately not in this document: the pre-mortem was run separately, and only the top two mitigations per charter were carried into the plan.