Reference

Worked example: Northgate Industrial Supply margin recovery

Part of the Executive Communication skill · loaded on demand from SKILL.md

Read this when you want to see the finished standard for every deliverable this skill produces: the audience profile, the SCQ, the pyramid with its horizontal-logic check, the full dot-dash storyline, the titles-only test, the one-page executive summary, the objection table, speaking notes, and the pre-wiring plan with outcomes.

Contents

  1. The situation and the audience
  2. SCQ and governing thought
  3. The pyramid and the horizontal-logic check
  4. Dot-dash storyline (15 slides)
  5. Titles-only test
  6. One-page executive summary
  7. Objection table
  8. Speaking notes (selected slides)
  9. Pre-wiring plan and outcomes
  10. What changed between ghost deck and final

1. The situation and the audience

Northgate Industrial Supply distributes MRO products (fasteners, cutting tools, safety equipment, fluid power) to manufacturers across fourteen branches. FY2025 revenue $640M, up from $610M in FY2022. EBITDA fell from $55.5M (9.1%) to $43.5M (6.8%) over the same three years. The board, concerned about the margin, asked management in June 2026 to bring a cost-reduction programme to the September steering committee. Management engaged the team in July to "size the cost opportunity". The problem-framing stage reframed the question to "is cost the right lever, and what would recover the margin?", with the CEO's agreement.

Decision the meeting must take: approve a margin-recovery programme and its governance, at the steering committee on 25 September 2026, 45 minutes.

PersonRole in decisionCurrent beliefStands to lose or gainTrustsBriefed
Marta Lindqvist, CEODecidesExpects a cost answer; privately doubts sales disciplineBoard confidence; wants a programme she can ownReconciled financials, peer comparisonsYes, at week 4
David Okafor, CFOMust agreeSuspects gross margin, has not proved itGains a pricing function under financeThe general ledger, transaction dataYes, weekly
Ray Castellano, COOMust agreeBelieves branches need override freedom to competeLoses branch autonomy on priceBranch-level cases, operational dataYes, at week 5
Jenna Marsh, SVP SalesMust agree, will executeBelieves a 2023 price rise failed because customers refused itCompensation plan, team credibilityCustomer examples, win-loss dataYes, at week 5
Howard Feld, Board chairAdvises the CEOAsked for cost; open to evidenceFiduciary exposure if margin keeps fallingOne-page summary, the headline numberSummary sent two days before

2. SCQ and governing thought

Situation: Northgate has grown revenue 5% in three years to $640M, with the same fourteen branches and a stable customer base of 11,200 active accounts.

Complication: Over the same period EBITDA margin fell from 9.1% to 6.8%, which is $14.7M of EBITDA against the FY2022 margin rate, and the board asked management to prepare a cost-reduction programme for September.

Question: Is cost the right lever, and what would recover the margin?

Governing thought: Northgate's margin loss is a pricing and mix problem, not a cost problem; a pricing and mix programme with a modest cost component recovers $22M of EBITDA by month 24 on a risk-adjusted basis and $31M at full potential.

Elevator version (28 seconds spoken): "The margin did not go to cost; opex is at peer median. It went to gross margin, because discounting below list doubled and growth concentrated in big accounts that earn nine points less. Fix pricing governance and account terms and you recover $22M to $31M in two years. We need three decisions today."

3. The pyramid and the horizontal-logic check

Governing thought (as above)

Key line, deductive:

  • A. The whole 2.3-point EBITDA decline sits in gross margin (2.1 points); the opex ratio moved 0.2 points and sits at peer median.
  • B. Gross margin fell because discounting became unmanaged (1.3 points) and growth concentrated in low-margin large accounts (0.6 points); both are fixable.
  • C. Therefore a pricing and mix programme ($25M) with a modest cost component ($6M) recovers $31M at full potential, $22M risk-adjusted, by month 24.

Horizontal-logic check at the key line: the relationship is deductive. B comments on the subject of A (the gross-margin loss) by giving its cause. C follows from A and B: if the loss is in gross margin and the cause is fixable pricing and mix, the recovery is a pricing and mix programme. Removing A: if the decline were in opex, C would not follow. Removing B: if the gross-margin loss were structural (say, commodity deflation), C would not follow. The chain is three steps. It is deductive by design because the board's question ("cost?") requires the audience to accept that cost is not the lever before hearing the answer; A is therefore placed first and proved hardest.

Support for A, inductive (two facts of the same kind: components of the decline):

  • A1. Gross margin fell 2.1 points, from 27.4% to 25.3%.
  • A2. Opex ratio rose 0.2 points, from 18.3% to 18.5%, and opex per branch is at the median of eleven peers.
  • Plural noun: "the two components of the margin decline". Order: by degree (largest first).

Support for B, inductive (two causes, each with its own evidence):

  • B1. Price realisation, 1.3 points: lines sold more than 15% below list rose from 22% to 41%; same-SKU same-segment price dispersion up to 30%; 71% of overrides approved at branch level without margin review.
  • B2. Customer mix, 0.6 points: top 50 accounts grew from 31% to 39% of revenue at 19.8% gross margin versus 28.9% for the rest; twelve of them lose money after cost to serve.
  • B3. Unpassed cost inflation, 0.2 points, is noted but not pursued (it is small and self-correcting once B1 is fixed).
  • Plural noun: "the three sources of gross-margin loss". Order: by degree.

Support for C, inductive (the moves, then the case for their value):

  • C1. Three pricing and mix moves: pricing architecture ($12.8M), discount governance ($6.4M), account profitability ($5.8M).
  • C2. Two cost moves: warehouse productivity ($2.5M), supplier rebate capture ($3.5M).
  • C3. Risk adjustment, phasing, risks and mitigations, decisions requested.
  • Plural noun: "the elements of the programme". Order: structural (what, then how much and when, then what could go wrong, then what we need from you).

Vertical check: the governing thought raises "why not cost, and what instead?". A answers "why not cost". B answers "then where did it go?". C answers "what instead, and how much?". Nothing in the key line answers a question the reader did not ask.

4. Dot-dash storyline (15 slides)

Status codes at the ghost stage are shown in brackets; all were "have" by the final draft.

  1. Northgate's EBITDA margin has fallen 2.3 points since FY2022; the cause is price and mix, not cost, and a pricing and mix programme recovers $22-31M within 24 months

    • The three key-line points as three boxes with their headline numbers [have]
    • Exhibit: executive summary layout, no chart
  2. Margin fell from 9.1% to 6.8% while revenue grew 5%; the entire decline sits in gross margin

    • FY2022 to FY2025: revenue $610M to $640M; gross margin 27.4% to 25.3%; opex 18.3% to 18.5%; EBITDA 9.1% to 6.8% [have]
    • Exhibit: margin bridge, 9.1% to 6.8%, two bars (gross margin minus 2.1, opex minus 0.2)
  3. The operating cost ratio moved only 0.2 points and sits at peer median: a cost programme alone recovers at most $6M

    • Opex per branch $8.5M versus peer median $8.4M, range $7.1M to $10.2M, eleven peers [have]
    • Warehouse productivity 61 lines per labour hour versus peer median 64 [have]
    • Supplier rebate tiers missed with four suppliers, $3.5M [have]
    • Exhibit: peer benchmark dot plot with Northgate marked, plus a two-line call-out of the $6M
  4. The 2.1-point gross margin loss decomposes into price realisation (1.3), customer mix (0.6) and unpassed cost inflation (0.2)

    • Price-volume-mix decomposition on 2.4M invoice lines over 36 months, reconciled to the general ledger within 0.4% [have]
    • Exhibit: waterfall from 27.4% to 25.3%
  5. Invoice lines sold more than 15% below list nearly doubled, from 22% to 41%, and explain the 1.3 points of price leakage

    • Share of lines by discount band, FY2022 versus FY2025 [have]
    • Gross-margin effect of the shift: 1.3 points [have]
    • Exhibit: stacked bars by discount band, two years
  6. The same SKU sells to the same customer segment at prices up to 30% apart, which is the absence of a pricing architecture, not a strategy

    • Top 200 SKUs, mid-size manufacturer segment: interquartile range of realised price 14%, maximum spread 30% [have]
    • Dispersion is not explained by volume, region or contract status (regression, r-squared 0.11) [have]
    • Exhibit: price-band scatter for three representative SKUs
  7. Seventy-one percent of discount overrides are approved at branch level with no margin review

    • 18,400 override approvals in FY2025; 71% at branch manager level; 0% with a margin check in the system [have]
    • The 2023 list price increase of 4% was eroded to 1.1% realised within nine months by overrides [have]
    • Exhibit: override approval flow with volumes at each step; small inset of 2023 list versus realised
  8. The top 50 accounts grew to 39% of revenue at 19.8% gross margin, nine points below the rest of the book

    • Top 50 share of revenue 31% to 39%; gross margin 19.8% versus 28.9% for the other 11,150 accounts [have]
    • Blended margin arithmetic: 0.39 x 19.8 + 0.61 x 28.9 = 25.3% [have]
    • Exhibit: two-period bar of revenue share with margin annotations
  9. Twelve of the top 50 accounts lose money after freight, small-order and service costs

    • Cost-to-serve model: freight, order handling, returns, field service, payment terms [have]
    • Twelve accounts, $58M revenue combined, minus $1.9M contribution after cost to serve [have]
    • Exhibit: whale curve of account contribution, top 50
  10. Three pricing and mix moves recover 3.9 points of gross margin, worth $25M: pricing architecture ($12.8M), discount governance ($6.4M), account profitability ($5.8M)

    • Pricing architecture: segment-based list prices with corridors, 2.0 points [have]
    • Discount governance: override cap at 20% below list, margin check in order entry, 1.0 point [have]
    • Account profitability: renegotiate terms on the twelve, introduce freight and small-order fees, 0.9 point [have]
    • Exhibit: three-column table, move, mechanism, value, basis of estimate
  11. Two cost moves add $6M: warehouse productivity to peer median ($2.5M) and supplier rebate capture ($3.5M)

    • Productivity: 61 to 64 lines per hour across fourteen branches, $2.5M labour [have]
    • Rebates: four supplier agreements with unclaimed tier thresholds, $3.5M [have]
    • Exhibit: two-row table with basis of estimate
  12. Risk-adjusted, the programme delivers $22M by month 24 and $31M at full potential, with a 1.5% volume loss already netted

    • Full potential $31.0M; risk adjustment by move (architecture 65%, governance 80%, accounts 60%, cost 85%) gives $22.0M [have]
    • Volume loss assumption 1.5% of revenue at 25.3% margin, $2.4M, netted in the pricing moves [have]
    • Exhibit: ramp chart, two lines, months 0 to 24
  13. The programme runs in three waves: architecture and governance (months 0-6), account renegotiation (months 4-12), cost (months 6-18)

    • Wave 1 includes a two-branch pilot of override caps in months 0-3 [have]
    • Exhibit: Gantt with value milestones
  14. The main risks are sales-force resistance and large-account attrition; incentive redesign and a two-branch pilot address both

    • Sales compensation moves from revenue to gross-margin dollars from January [have]
    • Pilot results gate the company-wide rollout; attrition trigger at 3% volume loss in pilot branches [have]
    • Exhibit: risk table, four rows: risk, indicator, mitigation, owner
  15. Decisions needed this quarter: approve the programme, appoint a pricing owner, and cap branch override authority by 1 November

    • Decision 1: approve the programme and its $31M full-potential target [have]
    • Decision 2: appoint a single pricing owner reporting to the CFO, in post by 15 October [have]
    • Decision 3: cap branch override authority at 20% below list from 1 November; above that, regional VP plus pricing owner [have]
    • Exhibit: three decisions with owner and date; next 90 days beneath

Appendix (not in the storyline): data reconciliation; PVM method; peer set and sources; cost-to-serve model; pilot design; sales compensation design.

5. Titles-only test

Read slides 1 to 15 as titles alone. Slide 1 gives the answer. Slides 2 and 3 prove that cost is not the lever. Slide 4 splits the gross-margin loss. Slides 5 to 7 prove that pricing is unmanaged. Slides 8 and 9 prove that mix is unmanaged. Slides 10 to 12 state the programme and its value. Slide 13 says when. Slide 14 says what could go wrong. Slide 15 asks for the decision. The titles form the argument without a body or a chart; the test passes.

Each title was also tested individually. Two failed the first draft. Slide 6's first draft was "Price dispersion analysis, top 200 SKUs": a label, rewritten to the claim above. Slide 12's first draft was "Programme value, risk-adjusted and full potential": a label, and it also referred to numbers only in the appendix; the ramp chart was moved to the slide and the title rewritten.

6. One-page executive summary

Northgate Industrial Supply: recovering margin through pricing and mix Steering committee, 25 September 2026

Northgate has grown revenue 5% in three years to $640M. Over the same period EBITDA margin has fallen from 9.1% to 6.8%, a loss of $14.7M against the FY2022 margin rate, and the board has asked management for a cost-reduction programme. The question this work answers is whether cost is the right lever, and what would recover the margin.

It is not. The whole 2.3-point decline sits in gross margin, while the operating cost ratio moved 0.2 points and sits at the peer median. Gross margin fell because discounting below list doubled to 41% of invoice lines with no margin review, and because growth concentrated in 50 large accounts that earn nine points less than the rest of the book. We recommend a pricing and mix programme with a modest cost component. It recovers $22M of EBITDA by month 24 on a risk-adjusted basis and $31M at full potential, net of an assumed 1.5% volume loss. Three decisions are needed this quarter: approve the programme, appoint a single pricing owner reporting to the CFO, and cap branch override authority at 20% below list from 1 November.

  1. Cost is not the lever. Gross margin fell 2.1 points (27.4% to 25.3%); the opex ratio rose 0.2 points and opex per branch ($8.5M) is at the median of eleven peers. A cost programme alone recovers at most $6M, from warehouse productivity ($2.5M) and unclaimed supplier rebates ($3.5M).

  2. The gross-margin loss comes from unmanaged pricing (1.3 points) and unmanaged mix (0.6 points). Lines sold more than 15% below list rose from 22% to 41%; the same SKU sells to the same segment at prices up to 30% apart; 71% of 18,400 overrides were approved at branch level with no margin check, which is why the 2023 list increase of 4% realised only 1.1%. The top 50 accounts grew from 31% to 39% of revenue at 19.8% gross margin against 28.9% for the rest, and twelve of them lose money after cost to serve.

  3. Five moves recover $31M at full potential. Pricing architecture with segment corridors ($12.8M), discount governance ($6.4M), account profitability on the twelve loss-making accounts and freight and small-order fees ($5.8M), warehouse productivity ($2.5M) and rebate capture ($3.5M). Risk-adjusted by move, the programme delivers $22M by month 24, in three waves, with a two-branch pilot of override caps in the first quarter.

Decisions requested: (1) approve the programme and the $31M full-potential target; (2) appoint a pricing owner reporting to the CFO, in post by 15 October; (3) cap branch override authority at 20% below list from 1 November, with exceptions approved by the regional VP and the pricing owner.

Risks and unknowns: sales-force resistance (mitigated by moving compensation to gross-margin dollars from January) and large-account attrition (pilot gates rollout; trigger at 3% volume loss). We have not analysed product-cost inflation pass-through in detail (0.2 points) or the branch network footprint; neither changes the recommendation.

Method: 2.4M invoice lines over 36 months, reconciled to the general ledger within 0.4%; eleven-company peer set from public filings; cost-to-serve model on the top 50 accounts; 22 interviews across branches, sales and finance.

7. Objection table

WhoObjectionEvidence that answers itSlideFallback
Jenna Marsh, SVP Sales"We raised list prices 4% in 2023 and customers refused it."Realised increase was 1.1%, not because customers refused but because 71% of overrides were approved at branch level; the list held, the discounts moved7Two-branch pilot of override caps before company-wide rollout
Jenna Marsh"Raise prices and we lose volume to Fastline and the nationals."Same SKU already sells at a 30% spread within the same segment, so customers are not paying a market price now; 1.5% volume loss is assumed and netted; pilot has a 3% attrition trigger6, 12, 14Phase the architecture by segment, starting with segments where dispersion is widest
Ray Castellano, COO"Branches need discretion to win local business."Discretion is retained up to 20% below list; only the top band changes, and that band carries 41% of lines with no margin check5, 7, 15Raise the cap to 25% for the pilot and tighten on evidence
Ray Castellano"The top 50 accounts are strategic; we cannot walk away."Recommendation is to renegotiate terms and add freight and small-order fees on twelve accounts, not to exit; $58M revenue at minus $1.9M contribution is not strategic, it is subsidised9, 10Sequence the twelve by relationship strength; start with the four where Northgate is sole source
David Okafor, CFO"Is the transaction data reliable enough to act on?"2.4M lines reconciled to the general ledger within 0.4%; decomposition is arithmetic, not model-based4, appendixOffer an independent reconciliation by internal audit before wave 1
Marta Lindqvist, CEO"The board asked for cost. Why go back with something else?"Cost is included ($6M) and is the ceiling of what cost can deliver; going back with cost alone leaves $25M unaddressed and the margin still falling3, 10, 11Present as "cost plus": the cost moves in wave 3 with the pricing moves in front
Marta Lindqvist"Why does pricing need a new owner reporting to the CFO?"Nobody owns price today: list is set by product management, discounts by branches, terms by sales; the 30% dispersion is the result6, 15Owner reports to the CEO for the first year, then to the CFO
Howard Feld, Board chair"How confident are you in $22M?"It is the risk-adjusted case with move-by-move haircuts of 15% to 40%; $31M is the full potential; the pilot in months 0-3 will tighten the range12, 13Commit to a re-forecast at month 6 with pilot results

8. Speaking notes (selected slides)

Slide 1. Say: "The margin did not go to cost. It went to price and mix, and it can be recovered." Number aloud: $22M to $31M. Transition: "Let me show you first why cost is not the answer, because that is the question the board asked." Likely question: "What do you need from us today?" Answer: point to the three decisions on slide 15, then return.

Slide 3. Say: "Northgate's operating cost per branch is $8.5M against a peer median of $8.4M. There is $6M in cost, and we have included it, but that is the ceiling." Number aloud: $6M. Transition: "So the 2.3 points are in gross margin. Here is how the 2.1 points split." Likely question: "Which peers?" Answer: appendix page 3, eleven public distributors, same product mix; name three.

Slide 7. Say: "Eighteen thousand overrides last year, seven in ten approved at branch level, none with a margin check. The 2023 price rise did not fail with customers; it failed in the order-entry screen." Number aloud: 71%. Transition: "That is pricing. The second cause is who we grew with." Likely question (Jenna Marsh): "Are you saying my branch managers are the problem?" Answer: "The system gives them no margin information at the moment of decision. This is a governance gap, not a people issue; that is why the fix is a cap and a screen, not a reorganisation."

Slide 12. Say: "Full potential is $31M. We have haircut each move by 15% to 40% depending on execution risk, which gives $22M by month 24. Both lines are net of 1.5% volume loss." Number aloud: $22M. Transition: "Here is the sequence." Likely question (Howard Feld): "What would take it below $20M?" Answer: "Losing the account renegotiations entirely takes the risk-adjusted case from $22M to $18.5M, which is why they are sequenced after the pilot; nothing else on the list moves it that far on its own."

Slide 15. Say: "Three decisions. Approve the programme. Name one owner for price, reporting to David. Cap branch override authority at 20% from 1 November." Number aloud: 1 November. Transition: none; stop and ask for the decision. Likely question: "Can we decide the cap after the pilot?" Answer: "The pilot tests the cap; without it there is nothing to pilot. We propose the cap in two branches now and company-wide on pilot evidence at month 3."

9. Pre-wiring plan and outcomes

OrderPersonDateShownExpected objectionOutcome
1David Okafor, CFO8 SeptFull deckData reliabilityConfirmed reconciliation; asked that the $14.7M gap be stated against FY2022 rate, not absolute; adopted
2Ray Castellano, COO11 SeptSummary plus slides 5, 7, 13, 15Branch discretionAccepted the cap if the pilot branches are his choice; agreed; pilot branches set at Springfield and Reading
3Jenna Marsh, SVP Sales14 SeptSummary plus slides 6, 7, 9, 142023 price rise; volume lossDisputed slide 7's framing as blaming sales; title unchanged, speaking note revised to "governance gap"; asked for compensation change to be in the deck; slide 14 updated
4Marta Lindqvist, CEO17 SeptFull deck, with a summary of 1-3Going back to the board with a non-cost answerAgreed to "cost plus" framing on slide 1 subtitle; questioned whether the pricing owner should report to her; settled on CFO reporting with a monthly review by the CEO for year one; slide 15 dash 2 updated
5Howard Feld, Board chair23 SeptOne-page summary, by email and a 20-minute callConfidence in $22MSatisfied by move-by-move haircuts; asked for a month-6 re-forecast; added to slide 13

Result: at the steering committee on 25 September, all three decisions were taken in 35 minutes. The only new material for anyone in the room was the pilot branch names.

10. What changed between ghost deck and final

The ghost deck at week 2 had twelve slides and guessed that the gross-margin loss was two-thirds mix and one-third price, because the CFO's early view was that "the big accounts are killing us". The PVM decomposition at week 4 showed the reverse: price realisation 1.3 points, mix 0.6. The titles for slides 4 to 9 were rewritten, the pricing evidence expanded from one slide to three, and the mix evidence cut from four slides to two. The governing thought changed from "renegotiate the large accounts" to "fix pricing governance first, then accounts". The findings did not move; the storyline did. Slide 13's wave order also changed as a result: governance now precedes account renegotiation, because renegotiating accounts before the override cap is in place would leave the branches free to give the margin back.