Reference

Worked example: Halden Industrial Supply, from mandate to workplan

Part of the Problem Framing skill · loaded on demand from SKILL.md

This is one complete pass through the problem-framing workflow. Every number is internally consistent; check them against each other if you change any. Read this when you want to see what a finished framing pack looks like before you build one, or when you are unsure how much detail a stage needs.

The client and the mandate

Halden Industrial Supply is a mid-market distributor of maintenance, repair and operating supplies (fasteners, cutting tools, safety equipment, fluid-power components) to manufacturers and contractors across three regions. It has 42 branches, three owned distribution centres, about 9,000 active accounts of which 22 are national accounts on multi-year contracts, and a field sales force of 118.

Financial history (fiscal years ending 31 March):

FY23FY24FY25
Revenue ($M)588.0604.0621.0
Gross margin (%)27.426.625.5
Gross profit ($M)161.1160.7158.4
Operating cost ($M)113.4116.0118.6
Operating cost (% of revenue)19.319.219.1
EBITDA ($M)47.744.739.8
EBITDA margin (%)8.17.46.4

The mandate, verbatim from the CEO, Marta Lindqvist, on 18 August 2026: "Our margins are eroding and the board wants a plan by the September meeting. Figure out what's going on and what we should do. I suspect we have too many branches."

The board meets on 29 September 2026. That gives six weeks.

Stage 1: Find the real question (SCQ)

The mandate as delivered is a Complication ("margins are eroding") with an Answer smuggled in ("too many branches"). Neither a Situation nor a Question has been stated. Rewriting it:

Situation (a statement the CEO would accept without argument): Halden has grown revenue 5.6 percent over two years to $621M, with 42 branches, three DCs, and a growing national-account book.

Complication (what changed): over the same two years EBITDA fell from $47.7M to $39.8M, and margin from 8.1 percent to 6.4 percent. The board has asked for a recovery plan at its 29 September meeting.

Question (the CEO's question, in her words if she had had time to write them): What should Halden do to restore EBITDA margin to at least 8 percent within 24 months, and which of those actions should the board approve in September?

Three things came out of writing this. First, the target was not in the mandate; "restore" implied getting back to FY23's 8.1 percent, and the CEO confirmed 8 percent as the floor when asked. Second, there are two decisions with different owners: the CEO decides the plan, the board approves it. Third, the CEO's branch hypothesis needs to be tested rather than accepted, because the arithmetic below does not obviously support it.

Stage 2: The problem-statement worksheet

FieldEntry
Decision-makerMarta Lindqvist, CEO, recommends; the board decides on 29 September 2026. CFO Raj Mehta must sign off the sizing.
QuestionWhat actions will restore Halden's EBITDA margin to at least 8.0 percent within 24 months, and which should the board approve in September?
Success criteriaA board-approved plan identifying at least $10M of run-rate EBITDA improvement (8.0 percent of $621M is $49.7M against $39.8M today), with at least 60 percent of it landing within 12 months. Sizing at plus or minus 20 percent.
ConstraintsNo closure of the three owned DCs (CEO decision, restated). The DC labour agreement runs to March 2027 and is not to be reopened. The ERP migration freezes changes to the pricing system until October 2026 (Q3 FY27). Revenue growth must not fall below 2 percent. Line-fill rate for the top 50 accounts must stay at or above the contracted 96 percent.
Scope inPricing (contract and non-contract), cost of goods (supplier terms, rebates, freight-in), customer and product mix, outbound distribution cost, branch network cost, sales-force and corporate cost.
Scope outAcquisitions or divestitures. ERP replacement. Changes to the DC footprint. Working-capital and balance-sheet actions (the question is EBITDA).
Time frameSix weeks to the board paper (draft due 22 September). Plan horizon 24 months from board approval, to September 2028, so the 8 percent run-rate must be visible in the FY29 budget.
Required accuracyPlus or minus 20 percent on each initiative's value for the board decision; budget-grade sizing (plus or minus 5 percent) follows in the execution phase and is out of scope here.
Known positionsCEO suspects branch count. CFO believes supplier cost inflation is the cause. VP Sales, Tom Brandt, believes national-account growth is worth the margin dilution. These are hypotheses to test, not findings.

Stage 3: Diagnostic tree (why did margin fall?)

Because the cause is disputed inside the company, a diagnostic tree comes before the solution tree. The root is decomposed by the P&L identity, which is MECE by construction.

Root: Why did EBITDA fall $7.9M (8.1 percent to 6.4 percent) from FY23 to FY25?

Level 1, by identity (EBITDA = revenue x gross margin percent, minus operating cost):

  • A. Revenue volume effect: +$9.0M (33.0 revenue growth x 27.4 percent FY23 margin).
  • B. Gross-margin rate effect: minus $11.8M (1.9 points x $621M).
  • C. Operating-cost growth: minus $5.2M (118.6 less 113.4).

Check: 47.7 + 9.0 minus 11.8 minus 5.2 = 39.7, against reported 39.8; the residual is rounding. The tree is exhaustive.

This already answers the CEO's implicit hypothesis. Operating cost as a percentage of revenue fell (19.3 to 19.1); cost grew slower than revenue. The whole decline and more sits in gross-margin rate. Branch closures could still be worth doing, but they are not the diagnosis.

Level 2 under B (gross-margin rate, minus 1.9 points), split into mix and within-segment rate:

  • B1. Customer mix: national accounts rose from 31 percent to 38 percent of revenue. At FY23 segment margins (national 23.5 percent, core accounts 29.2 percent), shifting 7 points of revenue costs about 0.4 points of blended margin, about $2.5M.
  • B2. Within-segment rate: national-account margin fell 23.5 to 22.0 percent; core-account margin fell 29.2 to 27.7 percent. Weighted at FY25 revenue shares (0.38 x 1.5 plus 0.62 x 1.5), 1.5 points, about $9.3M.

Check: 0.4 + 1.5 = 1.9 points; $2.5M + $9.3M = $11.8M. Exhaustive.

Level 3 under B2 (why did within-segment margin fall?), split by the price and cost sides of margin:

  • B2a. Price realisation: average discount from list on the non-contract book (about 60 percent of revenue) rose from 18.2 percent to 21.5 percent; contract prices on national accounts rose 1.9 percent a year against a cost index of 3.4 percent.
  • B2b. Cost of goods: supplier cost inflation averaged 3.4 percent a year; volume rebates were earned at a lower tier because purchasing was fragmented across the three DCs.

These are hypotheses at this stage; the numbers come from the CFO's first cut and need to be confirmed. The tree is nonetheless doing its job: it has narrowed a vague mandate to two mechanisms that together plausibly explain about $9M of the $11.8M rate decline.

Stage 4: Solution tree (how to restore 8 percent?)

Root: How can Halden add at least $10M of run-rate EBITDA within 24 months, inside the constraints?

Level 1, by the same identity:

  • A. Increase gross profit
  • B. Reduce operating cost

Level 2 under A, by the three components of gross profit:

  • A1. Price realisation
    • A1a. Contract (national-account) pricing: indexation clauses, renewal repricing
    • A1b. Non-contract pricing: discount authority, list adherence, minimum-margin floors
  • A2. Cost of goods: supplier consolidation, rebate tiers, freight-in terms
  • A3. Mix: shift revenue toward higher-margin core accounts and private label

Level 2 under B, by cost line (operating cost $118.6M):

  • B1. Distribution and outbound freight ($41.2M, of which freight $14.6M)
  • B2. Branch network, 42 branches ($38.9M)
  • B3. Sales force ($22.4M)
  • B4. Corporate and back office ($16.1M)

Check: 41.2 + 38.9 + 22.4 + 16.1 = 118.6. Exhaustive.

MECE checks applied. Classification test: a supplier rebate is cost of goods (A2), not price (A1); freight-in is A2, freight-out is B1; the split was made explicit so nothing lands twice. Same-cut test: level 2 under A is by margin component, level 2 under B is by cost line, each level uses one dimension. Count test: no level exceeds four branches.

Stage 5: So-what test and prioritisation

For each branch: rough size of impact in EBITDA dollars, ability to influence inside the constraints, and the so-what question (if this branch returned its most extreme plausible answer, what would the board do differently?).

BranchRough impact ($M run-rate)Ability to influenceSo-whatDecision
A1b Non-contract pricing6.1 (recover half of the 3.3-point discount creep on $373M of non-contract revenue)High: discount authority is a management decision; sales-force tooling constrained by ERP freeze until OctoberBoard would approve a pricing-discipline programmePriority 1
A1a Contract pricing2.4 (about 1 point on $236M; 14 of 22 national contracts renew within 18 months)Medium: depends on renewal calendar and customer toleranceBoard would set a floor margin for renewalsPriority 2
A2 Cost of goods1.3 to 2.7 (0.5 to 1.0 percent on $268M with the top 20 suppliers, 58 percent of $462.6M COGS)High: purchasing consolidation is internalBoard would approve a procurement programmePriority 3
B1 Outbound freight1.2 to 1.8 (8 to 12 percent of $14.6M through carrier rebid and consolidation)HighWould approve; low controversyPriority 4
B2 Branch network1.5 to 2.5 net (bottom-quartile 10 branches: $31M revenue, minus $0.9M contribution; savings after revenue leakage and service-level protection)Medium: 18 to 24 months to realise; line-fill constraint; local customer riskWould approve a phased review, not closures in SeptemberPriority 5, phase 2
A3 Mix0.35 per point of revenue shifted from national to core (5.7-point FY25 margin gap on $6.21M per point); needs 5 or more points to matterLow within 24 months: mix follows the marketWould not change the September decisionWatch; size only
B3 Sales forceCost cut of 5 percent is $1.1M but the sales force is the delivery mechanism for A1bLow: cutting it undermines Priority 1Would not cutPrune as a cost lever; fold into A1b as an enabler
B4 Corporate0.8 (5 percent of $16.1M)High but smallWould not change the decisionPrune; note for the execution phase

Prioritised branches sum to roughly $14M of identified opportunity against the $10M target, which leaves room for attrition when the analysis returns. Everything pruned is recorded with the reason, so it can be revived if Priority 1 disappoints.

Stage 6: Hypotheses and the day-one answer

Converting the surviving branches into assertions:

  • H1. At least $5M of run-rate EBITDA is recoverable by restoring non-contract discount discipline to the FY23 level, without losing more than 1 percent of that revenue. Load-bearing assumptions (recorded here, tested in hypothesis-stress-testing): discount creep is concentrated in a minority of reps and accounts (so it can be reversed with authority rules rather than across-the-board increases); competitor pricing has not fallen in step; the ERP freeze does not block a manual discount-approval process.
  • H2. National-account renewals in the next 18 months can carry cost-indexation clauses worth at least $2M, because the contracts that already have such clauses (about 40 percent of the book) held margin over the period.
  • H3. Consolidating purchasing across the three DCs moves Halden up at least one rebate tier with 8 of its top 20 suppliers, worth at least $1.5M.
  • H4. Freight carrier rebid and order consolidation are worth at least $1.2M, with no service-level impact.
  • H5 (negative hypothesis, the CEO's): branch closures are not the primary answer within 24 months; the bottom-quartile branches are worth at most $2.5M net and carry service-level risk with the top 50 accounts. Kept as a phase-2 review.

Day-one answer, in SCR form:

Situation: Halden has grown revenue 5.6 percent in two years to $621M and expanded its national-account business to 38 percent of sales.

Complication: EBITDA has fallen $7.9M to $39.8M (6.4 percent margin). Operating cost as a share of revenue actually improved; the entire decline is in gross-margin rate, driven by discount creep on non-contract business and by supplier cost inflation that was not passed through on contract business.

Resolution (current best thinking): Halden can restore an 8 percent margin within 24 months mainly through pricing discipline and supplier pass-through (about $8M to $10M), supplemented by procurement and freight (about $3M). A branch-network review belongs in phase 2 and should not be presented to the board as the main answer in September.

Stage 7: Workplan

Team: Sarah Cole (engagement manager), Priya Nair (analyst, pricing), Ben Walsh (analyst, procurement and logistics). Client counterparts: Raj Mehta (CFO), Daniel Okafor (FP&A lead), Tom Brandt (VP Sales), Elena Petrova (VP Supply Chain).

#IssueHypothesisAnalysis neededSourceOwnerDue
1Where is non-contract discount creep concentrated?H1: in a minority of reps and accountsInvoice-level margin distribution FY23 vs FY25 by rep, branch, account, product family; discount waterfall from list to pocket priceERP invoice extract (Okafor), price list historyPriya Nair1 Sep
2Would customers accept discount reversal?H1: yes, for the majority of accountsPrice elasticity proxy: win/loss on the 200 accounts with the largest discount increases; 12 customer interviews via VP SalesCRM win/loss, interviews (Brandt to arrange)Priya Nair, Sarah Cole8 Sep
3Can discount authority be changed during the ERP freeze?H1: yes, via manual approval workflowMap current approval workflow; test a manual floor with two branches for two weeksPricing team, branch managersSarah Cole4 Sep
4What is the margin difference between indexed and non-indexed national contracts?H2Contract-by-contract margin trend for all 22 national accounts; renewal calendar; clause inventoryContract files (Brandt), FP&A margin by accountPriya Nair4 Sep
5What rebate tier does Halden earn with its top 20 suppliers, and what would consolidated volume earn?H3Spend cube by supplier and DC; rebate schedules; tier gap analysisAP spend extract (Okafor), supplier agreements (Petrova)Ben Walsh8 Sep
6What can carrier rebid and order consolidation save?H4Freight spend by lane and carrier; order-size distribution; two carrier indicative quotesFreight invoices, TMS data (Petrova)Ben Walsh11 Sep
7What is the net value and service risk of closing the bottom-quartile branches?H5 (negative)Branch P&L with revenue-leakage assumptions from the two closures done in FY22; top-50 account exposure by branchBranch P&L (Okafor), FY22 closure post-mortemBen Walsh11 Sep
8Do the initiatives add up to $10M with 60 percent inside 12 months?SynthesisInitiative ledger with timing; overlap check between H1 and H2 (same accounts counted twice?)Outputs of 1 to 7Sarah Cole15 Sep

Checkpoints: refreshed one-day answer to the CEO on 4 September; steering committee (CEO, CFO, VP Sales, VP Supply Chain) on 11 September; draft board paper 22 September; board 29 September.

Note the overlap check in row 8. H1 (non-contract) and H2 (contract) are mutually exclusive by construction, but some national accounts also buy off-contract; the ledger must assign those dollars to one initiative only.

What this framing handed to the next skills

  • To hypothesis-stress-testing: H1 to H5 with their load-bearing assumptions and refuting observations, plus the analysis plan; that skill turns the assumptions into refutation conditions and tests them.
  • To value-driver-modeling: the P&L bridge and the initiative ledger structure, for the sizing model.
  • To primary-research-synthesis: the 12 customer interviews (row 2) as a small interview programme with a guide built around price tolerance.
  • To executive-communication: the SCR day-one answer as the seed of the board storyline.