Reference
Worked Example: Oakmere Payments
Part of the War Gaming skill · loaded on demand from SKILL.md
Contents
- Situation and focal decision
- Predetermined elements and candidate uncertainties
- The two critical uncertainties
- Four scenarios with parameter tables
- Signposts
- Value Net and competitor response profiles
- Competitor-response matrix
- War-game design
- Play record: three rounds
- Payoff table and robustness verdict
- Adaptive plan and hand-offs
1. Situation and focal decision
Oakmere Payments Ltd ("Oakmere") is a licensed e-money institution headquartered in London, authorised in the United Kingdom and, through an Irish subsidiary authorised in 2023, in Ireland and the wider euro area. It provides business payment accounts, multi-currency accounts, commercial cards and payment APIs to small and medium-sized businesses, and embeds those accounts inside software platforms and marketplaces. Ownership: founders 31%, a growth-equity investor 34% (holding since 2023, planning a liquidity event in 2030), employees 12%, earlier venture investors 23%. Executives: Daniel Okafor (co-founder and CEO), Helen Marsh (CFO), Tomas Lindgren (Chief Risk and Compliance Officer), Aisha Bello (Chief Product Officer), Rory Quinn (Chief Commercial Officer), Mei Tan (VP Strategy). The chair, Margaret Holloway, is the growth investor's nominee.
Fiscal 2026: payment volume £48,000M; net revenue £180M, made up of commercial-card interchange £36M (20%), FX and cross-border fees £58M (32%), subscription and platform fees £50M (28%) and net interest on safeguarded balances and own funds £36M (20%). Gross profit after scheme, processing, sponsor-bank and fraud costs £122M (68%); operating expenses £90M; EBITDA £32M (18%). No debt; group cash £95M, of which £70M is held as own funds in the regulated entities against a requirement of £38M (2% of average outstanding e-money of £1,900M), a cover of 184%. 60,000 active SME accounts and 180 software platforms and marketplaces that embed Oakmere accounts. The top 300 accounts (the 180 platforms and the 120 largest direct SMEs) generate £108M (60%) of net revenue. The SME payment-account revenue pool in the two markets is estimated at £2,400M, giving Oakmere a 7.5% share.
strategic-choice delivered three options, each with its "what would have to be true" list:
| Option | Content | Investment | Key condition that would have to be true |
|---|---|---|---|
| A: Deepen the Core | Add 120 sales, onboarding and relationship staff (30% more), launch a premium account tier, hold self-serve pricing, compete on service and speed of onboarding | £28M over 2027-2029 | SMEs keep choosing a standalone payments account on service and relationship rather than a wallet bundled into their bank app or their software |
| B: Embedded Platform | Build an embedded-finance API platform (accounts, cards, payments, onboarding and compliance-as-a-service) for software platforms and marketplaces; move the top 300 accounts to three-year platform contracts with volume-tiered pricing and compliance service bundled | £60M over 2027-2029 (platform £30M, compliance and onboarding tooling £18M, migration and sales £12M) | SME payments migrate into software platforms, but platforms still pay a licensed provider to carry the compliance |
| C: Acquire and Lend | Acquire Tallis Financial (£70M revenue, £9M EBITDA, a licensed SME lender with a £220M loan book, indicative price £180M) and Fernleigh Payments (£18M revenue, £3M EBITDA, an e-money firm with marketplace acquiring, price £40M), reaching £268M revenue and £16M of run-rate synergies from duplicate licences, sponsor-bank fees, technology and cross-selling loans to Oakmere's SMEs | £220M, funded by a £150M acquisition facility (covenant: net debt under 3.5x EBITDA) and £70M of new equity agreed in principle by the growth investor; pro forma net debt £150M (3.4x pro forma EBITDA of £44M before synergies; 2.5x at the £60M run-rate) | No bank contests the targets, and the prudential regime stays proportionate enough for a debt-funded group holding a lending book |
Focal decision: which option does the board commit to at its March 2027 meeting? Horizon: fiscal 2029. Uncertainty level: 2 to 3 (a small number of discrete regulatory and competitive outcomes, each with a range).
2. Predetermined elements and candidate uncertainties
Predetermined elements (in every scenario):
- The UK regulator's new safeguarding rules for payments and e-money firms (policy statement published 2025, in force from May 2026) require monthly safeguarding returns and an annual safeguarding audit. Oakmere's compliance cost rises by about £2.5M a year regardless of scenario; the end-state rules are the uncertainty, the interim cost is not.
- The EU instant payments regulation (2024) requires payment and e-money institutions in the euro area to send and receive instant euro credit transfers by April 2027, and amended the settlement-finality rules so that non-bank payment firms can seek direct access to designated payment systems. Oakmere's Irish entity must build instant payments in 2027 in every scenario.
- The handset NFC interface is open to third-party wallets in both markets (a commitments decision in the EU in July 2024; a developer release in the UK in late 2024). Any bank or big-tech wallet can offer tap-to-pay cards on the device without a platform gatekeeper.
- Mandatory reimbursement of authorised push-payment fraud has applied to UK payment firms since October 2024, with a per-claim cap and the cost shared between sending and receiving firms. Oakmere's reimbursement cost is £4M a year and is in every scenario.
- Interest rates: the forward curve used by Oakmere's treasury implies policy rates about 100 basis points lower by 2028. Net interest on safeguarded balances falls from £36M to about £27M by 2029, a £9M headwind in every scenario. This is the finding management had not priced in.
- Brackenridge Bank's core-banking migration, which has absorbed its SME technology budget since 2024, completes in mid-2027 (management statement). Kestrel launched its business wallet in the United States in 2025 and has stated a plan of two new markets a year.
- Tallis Financial's lead investor is in year nine of a ten-year fund; an exit process before 2029 is not in doubt. Who buys is.
Candidate uncertainties, scored (importance, uncertainty, 1-5):
| Candidate | Range by 2029 | Imp. | Unc. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prudential and conduct settlement for non-bank payment firms, as incremental cost in points of net revenue | +2 to +10 points | 5 | 5 |
| Incumbent entry into SME embedded payments (largest banks, big-tech wallets, card networks with a live product in the two markets) | 0 to 4 incumbents | 5 | 4 |
| SME formation and payment-volume growth | 3% to 8% a year | 4 | 2 |
| Extension of interchange caps to commercial cards | None to a full cap | 4 | 3 |
| Policy rate path | 2.5% to 4.0% | 3 | 2 |
| Fraud loss and reimbursement burden | 0.5 to 2.0 basis points of volume | 3 | 3 |
| Open-banking transfers displacing card rails for SME payments | 5% to 25% of SME payment volume | 3 | 4 |
Regulatory settlement and incumbent entry are the two top-right candidates. Volume growth, the rate path and fraud burden were retained as sensitivities within each scenario. The interchange-cap extension was folded into the regulatory axis as a composite; open-banking displacement was folded into the incumbent-entry axis, because the players who would push it are the banks.
3. The two critical uncertainties
Axis A: Regulatory settlement. The prudential and conduct regime that applies to non-bank payment firms in the two markets in 2029, measured as incremental compliance and capital-related cost against 2026. Low end, "Proportionate": under 4 points of net revenue; the own-funds requirement stays at 2% of average outstanding e-money; commercial-card interchange stays uncapped. High end, "Bank-like": over 8 points of net revenue; the own-funds requirement rises to about 3% with a liquidity buffer on top; safeguarding moves to a trust-with-audit regime; the interchange cap is extended to commercial cards. Mechanism for the high end: a mid-sized e-money firm fails with a safeguarding shortfall, the political response is to push firms that hold customer money toward bank-style rules, and the EU's revised payments framework lands at its strict end. Mechanism for the low end: regulators under a growth and competition mandate land the revised framework on proportionate terms and widen direct access to payment systems. Credible believer at each end: a former prudential regulator has argued publicly that a firm holding money for customers should be regulated like one; the payments trade body's chief executive has argued the proportionate case in its 2025 submission.
Axis B: Incumbent entry. The number of incumbents (the five largest banks, the two big-tech wallets and the two card networks in the two markets) with a live SME embedded-payments product priced at or below Oakmere's by 2029, and the share of new SME payment-account openings they take. Low end, "Incumbents hold back": at most one, and under 20% of new openings. High end, "Incumbents enter": two or more, and over 40% of new openings. Mechanism for the high end: Brackenridge's migration completes and frees its technology budget, Kestrel follows its two-markets-a-year plan into the UK and Ireland, and a card network launches a direct SME account programme with a processor. Mechanism for the low end: banks judge SME embedded payments too small to justify the conduct risk, Kestrel prioritises larger markets, and the networks stay behind their issuers.
Independence: the regulatory settlement is driven by political response to failures and fraud and by the EU legislative cycle; incumbent entry is driven by the capital allocation of banks and platforms and by card-network economics. Bank-like rules would raise entry cost for Kestrel and favour Brackenridge, so the axes are partly correlated in opposite directions, but each off-diagonal cell has a plausible route: proportionate rules with incumbent entry (low barriers invite Kestrel and a bank freed from its migration) and bank-like rules with incumbents holding back (banks already compliant but uninterested, Kestrel deterred by scrutiny of big-tech bundling).
4. Four scenarios
| Incumbents hold back | Incumbents enter | |
|---|---|---|
| Regulation bank-like | Narrow Gate | Home Advantage |
| Regulation proportionate | Open Runway (base case) | Crowded Rails |
Open Runway (base case). Looking back from 2029: SME payment volume in the two markets grew about 6% a year. The EU's revised payments framework landed on proportionate terms in 2027, the UK regulator kept own funds at 2% of outstanding e-money and added the safeguarding audit it had already announced, and interest on safeguarded balances fell exactly as the forward curve said it would. Brackenridge completed its core migration in 2027, kept its embedded-payments pilot to two accounting platforms, and treated fintechs as sponsor-bank customers rather than rivals. Kestrel launched its business wallet in two larger markets and left the UK and Ireland for later. Tallis's lead investor secured a two-year fund extension, Tallis refinanced its warehouse facility and signed a lending partnership with Oakmere. Pricing stayed rational: self-serve FX margins drifted down 5 basis points and platform fees held. Oakmere's problem in this world is not survival but whether it spent £60M on a platform its customers did not ask for. Base case because it extends every observable trend without a discontinuity; that is also why it deserves the least trust.
Crowded Rails. Looking back from 2029: the rules stayed proportionate, which lowered the cost of entry, and the incumbents came. Brackenridge, freed from its migration, bought Tallis in mid-2027 after the fund's exit process opened, and by 2028 was offering a bundle of bank account, Tallis lending and embedded payments to the 200 largest software platforms in the two markets at 15% below Oakmere's contract rate, funding the loans from deposits at a cost no warehouse facility could match. Kestrel launched its business wallet in the UK and Ireland in 2028 with free domestic payments and FX priced 30 basis points below Oakmere's self-serve rate. A card network launched a direct SME account programme with a processor. Incumbents took 45% of new SME account openings and self-serve FX margins fell 30 basis points across the market. Oakmere's problem in this world is being the second-largest independent against a bank with deposit funding and a wallet with no take rate. The winner in this world is whoever holds the platforms under contract before the bundles arrive.
Narrow Gate. Looking back from 2029: a mid-sized e-money firm failed in 2027 with a £40M safeguarding shortfall, and the political response was bank-like rules. Own funds rose to 3% of outstanding e-money with a liquidity buffer, safeguarding moved to a trust-with-audit regime, and the interchange cap was extended to commercial cards; the EU framework landed at its strict end. Brackenridge already met every rule but stayed out: its board judged SME embedded payments too small to carry the conduct risk, and its ventures team was disbanded when the migration overran. Kestrel deferred its UK and Ireland launch, citing scrutiny of big-tech bundling. Tallis, unable to raise capital under the new rules, sold to a private-equity buyer at a distressed price in 2029; eight of the 25 smaller e-money firms handed back their authorisations. Software platforms that had planned to obtain their own licences abandoned the idea and outsourced to the three scaled licensed providers that remained. The players who prospered were those who could pay for the rules and sell compliance to others. Oakmere's problem in this world is the cost of the rules against the value of scarcity.
Home Advantage. Looking back from 2029: both discontinuities arrived together. The rules turned bank-like in 2027, and Brackenridge, already compliant, used the advantage: it bought Tallis in 2027, launched the account-plus-lending-plus-embedded bundle to the top 200 platforms in 2028, and priced it 15% below Oakmere. Kestrel launched in 2028 regardless, because its scale absorbs any compliance cost, and kept domestic payments free for the two years its history predicts. Incumbents took 45% of new openings, own funds rose to 3%, and commercial-card interchange was capped. Twelve of the 25 smaller e-money firms sold or handed back their authorisations, most to Brackenridge or to private equity, and the independent SME payments segment shrank to Oakmere and two others. Oakmere's problem in this world is existential: it is neither the cheapest nor the best-capitalised, and £108M of top-account revenue is being bid for by two players with a lower cost of capital and compliance already paid for.
Parameter table (2029 values used in the model):
| Parameter | Open Runway | Crowded Rails | Narrow Gate | Home Advantage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SME payment-volume growth, a year | 6% | 6% | 6% | 6% |
| Own-funds requirement, share of average outstanding e-money | 2.0% | 2.0% | 3.0% plus liquidity buffer | 3.0% plus liquidity buffer |
| Incremental compliance and capital-related cost vs 2026, £M a year | 3 | 3 | 14 | 14 |
| Commercial-card interchange yield vs 2026 | 0% | 0% | -20% | -20% |
| Incumbents with a live SME embedded-payments product | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 |
| Incumbent share of new SME account openings | 15% | 45% | 15% | 45% |
| Kestrel business wallet live in the two markets | No | From 2028 | No | From 2028 |
| Tallis status | Independent, partnered with Oakmere | Owned by Brackenridge | Distressed sale to private equity | Owned by Brackenridge |
| Net interest on safeguarded balances, £M | 27 | 27 | 27 | 27 |
| Wage inflation, engineering and compliance roles | 5% | 5% | 5% | 5% |
Against the proportionate cells, the bank-like cells cost every option about £19M of 2029 EBITDA before any rival move: £11M of extra compliance and capital-related cost (£14M less £3M) and £8M of interchange yield (20% of a 2029 commercial-card interchange base of about £40M).
5. Signposts
| Signpost | Axis | Source | Threshold | Review by | Owner | Action if tripped |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kestrel prepares a business wallet for the UK or Ireland | B high | Regulator public registers (permissions and passport notifications), developer documentation, job boards, press | Business-account permission or passport in either market, or more than 10 business-wallet job postings in London or Dublin in a quarter | Quarterly, first check June 2027 | VP Strategy | Pull Option B platform launch forward two quarters; open contract conversations with the top 300 accounts |
| Share of Oakmere's top-300 accounts issuing RFPs that require an embedded-finance API and a compliance attestation | B high | Oakmere commercial RFP log (external signal, internal source) | Above 30% of RFPs in any quarter (2026: 12%) | Quarterly | Chief Commercial Officer | Confirms platforms are choosing providers; accelerate contract migration |
| Brackenridge's core migration declared complete | B high | Brackenridge investor calls and results | Management statement | Quarterly | CFO | Brackenridge bandwidth freed; raise belief in an embedded launch or an acquisition |
| Brackenridge announces any acquisition of a payments or lending fintech in the two markets | B high | Press, Brackenridge filings, regulator change-of-control notices | One announced deal | Monthly scan | CFO | Exercise the Tallis right of first refusal if not already done; re-run Option C economics |
| Tallis appoints an adviser or an outside CEO, or its lead investor announces a fund extension | B high (sale to a bank) or B low (extension) | Industry contacts, press, LinkedIn, fund announcements | Any of the three events | Monthly | CEO | Adviser or outside CEO: open partnership or acquisition conversation within 30 days. Extension: belief shift toward Incumbents hold back |
| Regulator consultation proposing own-funds add-ons or liquidity requirements for e-money firms | A high | UK and Irish regulator consultation papers, EU legislative trackers | A published consultation proposing a requirement above 2% of outstanding e-money | Monthly | Chief Risk and Compliance Officer | Re-run the capital plan; freeze the Option C debt structure |
| An e-money firm fails with a safeguarding shortfall in either market | A high | Insolvency notices, regulator statements, press | One failure with a shortfall over £20M | Monthly | Chief Risk and Compliance Officer | Belief shift toward Bank-like; begin the own-funds build to 150% of the projected requirement |
| Interchange-cap extension to commercial cards proposed | A high (composite) | Regulator market reviews, legislative texts | A formal proposal in either market | Quarterly | CFO | Re-price the card programme; belief shift toward Bank-like |
6. Value Net and competitor response profiles
Value Net for Oakmere. Customers: 60,000 SMEs and 180 software platforms and marketplaces; the buyer of payments is increasingly the platform's product team, which chooses a provider for thousands of SMEs at once, rather than the SME's owner. Suppliers: two sponsor banks that provide scheme access and safeguarding accounts, two card schemes, a processor and the identity-data vendors; several sponsor banks have tightened their terms for non-bank payment firms since 2024, so a sponsor bank that loses Oakmere's balances under Option C is a player, not background. Competitors: Brackenridge, Kestrel, Tallis and 25 smaller e-money firms. Complementors: the two dominant accounting-software platforms (a certified integration makes an Oakmere account more valuable to an SME that runs the software), the card schemes' tokenisation services, open-banking API providers and the identity-data vendors. The complementor that matters most for Option B is the accounting-software platform: a certified integration is cheap for Oakmere and raises switching costs for the customer.
Brackenridge Bank. Objectives: defend its 22% share of SME primary relationships, because SME deposits fund its lending; hold cost-income below 55%; management is measured on SME deposit share and digital adoption. Assumptions: fintechs win on interface, not economics; deposits and lending decide margin; embedded payments is a channel, not a business. Current strategy: complete the core migration by mid-2027; pilot embedded SME payments with two accounting platforms; buy fintech capability rather than build it (two acquisitions in four years). Capabilities: a £1,200M annual technology budget, a balance sheet that funds loans at deposit cost, a bank licence that already meets any bank-like rule, and a 60-person ventures and M&A team occupied by the migration until mid-2027. Constraints: integration bandwidth; a conduct-risk appetite that requires an acquired fintech to meet bank standards within 18 months; a public cost-income commitment. History of reaction: has matched fintech FX pricing on SME accounts within two quarters in two of the last three instances; has counter-bid once for a fintech target when a rival was known to be in process.
Kestrel Pay. Objectives: engagement and payment volume through its wallet; take rate secondary; two new markets a year for the business wallet. Assumptions: a wallet embedded in the device and the consumer app beats a standalone account for micro-businesses; account management is a cost it should not carry. Current strategy: free domestic payments, FX priced at cost plus a thin margin, monetised through adjacent services (marketplace fees, advertising, hardware). Capabilities: 24M active consumer wallet users in the two markets, the handset interface, e-money authorisations in both markets, capital without limit. Constraints: no relationship managers, no appetite for lending, competition authorities watching its bundling so it avoids exclusive ties; its US business wallet is aimed at businesses with fewer than ten employees. History of reaction: has never matched a competitor's service offering; has entered markets with free pricing and held it for 18 to 24 months before charging for adjacent services.
Tallis Financial. Objectives: an exit within two years at a price that returns the lead investor's fund; retain the 320-person team; the founders, who hold 28%, want product continuity. Assumptions: its SME lending data is a durable advantage; the business is worth about 2.5x revenue to a bank. Current strategy: hold price, grow the loan book within the warehouse limit, no new markets. Capabilities: a modern stack, SME underwriting models, 45,000 customers with 55% overlap with Oakmere's target segment, e-money authorisations in both markets and the credit permissions its lending requires. Constraints: warehouse covenants, £15M of cash, the investor's timeline, no capital for a platform build. History of reaction: has never initiated a price move; has followed Oakmere's pricing changes within a quarter for five years.
7. Competitor-response matrix
| Rival | Our option | Will they react? | Likely move (and second) | Lead time | Damage to us (2029 EBITDA) | Our counter |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brackenridge | A | Only if Oakmere's sales push wins primary relationships with deposits above £250,000; otherwise no | Match FX pricing on contested SME accounts (second: none) | 1-2 quarters | £2M in every scenario | Concentrate the new staff on SMEs that bank elsewhere; avoid Brackenridge's primary-relationship accounts |
| Brackenridge | B | Yes, if Oakmere's contracts lock platforms before Brackenridge arrives | Offer the bank-account-plus-lending-plus-embedded bundle at 15% below Oakmere's contract rate to the top 200 platforms (second: accelerate its own embedded product) | 2-3 quarters after seeing contract uptake | £2M in Open Runway and Narrow Gate (FX matching); £4M in Crowded Rails and Home Advantage (the bundle) | Three-year platform contracts with compliance service bundled; Brackenridge's bundle cannot carry sub-merchant compliance for a platform without a team it does not have |
| Brackenridge | C | Yes, immediately | Counter-bid for Tallis, whose loan book is worth more on a deposit-funded balance sheet (second: bid for Fernleigh) | Within 30 days of a known process | Price for Tallis rises from £180M to £225M; Option C's 2029 cash return falls from 14.4% to 11.6%, below the 12% cost of capital | Pre-empt the process with a negotiated exclusive or a right of first refusal; do not enter an auction against deposit funding |
| Kestrel | A | Yes, once its business wallet launches; A's price hold is an invitation | Free domestic payments and FX 30 basis points below Oakmere's self-serve rate (second: place its wallet inside the two accounting-software platforms' app stores) | Launches with the wallet, 2028 in Incumbents-enter scenarios | £8M in Crowded Rails, £10M in Home Advantage | None that works: A cannot match free without abandoning its economics |
| Kestrel | B | Yes, within two quarters of the platform launch | Same pricing on self-serve accounts plus a campaign against "platform fees" (second: the app-store placement) | 2 quarters | £3M in Crowded Rails, £4M in Home Advantage | Do not match self-serve price; move the top 300 to contracts where unit price is not the comparison; certify integrations with the two accounting platforms first |
| Kestrel | C | Indifferent to the acquisition; treats a larger account provider as more of the same | Continue its own plan (second: none) | n/a | £9M in Crowded Rails, £11M in Home Advantage: the same move as against A, on a larger self-serve base | As for A: none that works |
| Tallis | A | Follows | Match Oakmere's pricing changes as always | 1 quarter | Negligible | None needed |
| Tallis | B | No capability to respond | Emphasise lending and personal service to its 45,000 customers; seek a platform partner (second: put itself up for sale) | 2-4 quarters | Negligible; may gain share at Tallis's expense | Offer Tallis an embedded-lending partnership on the platform; converts a rival into a complementor and a future acquisition on better terms |
| Tallis | C | Yes: it is the target | Run a competitive process to maximise price; invite Brackenridge (second: sell to Oakmere on exclusive terms if offered speed, team retention and product continuity) | Immediate | See Brackenridge C cell | Offer certainty, speed and team commitments in exchange for exclusivity |
The matrix already shows the shape of the answer: Option A has no counter to Kestrel, Option C provokes the one rival whose funding cost makes the target worth more to it than to Oakmere, and Option B's damage is bounded because its counter moves the comparison away from unit price. The war game tests whether that holds when people rather than analysts play the rivals.
8. War-game design
Held 18-19 January 2027 at Oakmere's London office, eight weeks before the board decision.
Teams:
| Team | Members | Payoff metric given to the team |
|---|---|---|
| Oakmere (home) | CEO, CFO, Chief Risk and Compliance Officer, Chief Product Officer, Chief Commercial Officer, VP Strategy | 2029 EBITDA subject to own funds at 120% of requirement or more and net debt under 3.5x |
| Brackenridge | Oakmere's head of banking partnerships (a former bank executive), two former bank SME managers (outside advisers), one outside industry adviser | SME primary-relationship share and deposit share by 2029 and acquisition count, subject to the cost-income commitment |
| Kestrel | Head of product growth, pricing lead, one outside adviser from a consumer platform | Business-wallet volume and active businesses in the two markets; take rate secondary |
| Tallis | A former fintech founder (outside adviser), Oakmere's head of corporate development, one lending product manager | Exit value; team retention |
| Market | Two platform product heads (invited under NDA), one SME finance director, Oakmere's head of customer insight | Total cost and integration and service score at 20 representative accounts |
| Control | Engagement partner, two consultants, Oakmere FP&A lead running the model | n/a |
Rounds: three, each representing one fiscal year (2027, 2028, 2029). Each round: 60 minutes of team deliberation, written move sheets submitted to Control, 40 minutes of adjudication during which teams hear the Market team's reaction, 20 minutes plenary. Setting: base case (Open Runway) at the start, with injects that move the world toward Home Advantage, so that the game covers the widest span.
Home team option: Oakmere played Option B in the live game, as the front-runner from strategic-choice. Control ran two desk-game variants for Options A and C in the evening between the two days, using the rival teams' written playbooks from Round 1 and the same injects, and presented all three on the morning of day two.
Adjudication rule (published in the briefing pack): on self-serve accounts, each player's volume moves 1% for every 5 basis points of FX-margin gap and 2% for a free domestic-payment offer against a paid one, with a two-quarter lag and a cap of 10% a year; on contracted platform revenue, share moves 0.3 points for every point of Market-team integration score gap, and contracted revenue does not move before renewal; no player can onboard more than 40 platforms a year or obtain a new authorisation in under 12 months; acquisitions close two quarters after agreement to allow for change-of-control approval; the acquirer's synergy capture is 60% in year one and 100% by year three.
Injects:
- Round 2 opening: Tallis's lead investor's fund reaches the end of its term without an extension and the Tallis board appoints an adviser to run a sale process (tests the incumbent-entry axis and Option C's assumption of an uncontested deal).
- Round 3 opening: Kestrel launches its business wallet in the UK and Ireland with free domestic payments and FX 30 basis points below Oakmere's self-serve rate, and the regulator publishes final rules raising own funds to 3% with a liquidity buffer and extending the interchange cap to commercial cards (tests both axes and the "what would have to be true" of every option).
- Round 3, mid-round: the two largest marketplaces in the two markets issue RFPs requiring an embedded-finance provider with a lending partner and a compliance attestation covering their sub-merchants (tests whether bundled compliance or price wins new demand).
9. Play record: three rounds
Round 1 (2027). Oakmere announced the platform build and opened contract negotiations with its top 300 accounts, offering a three-year rate with compliance service included. Brackenridge, absorbed by its migration, took no market action but noted the contracts and instructed its ventures team to "find a way into embedded SME payments before those contracts lock in", which was the first surprise: the Brackenridge team saw Oakmere's contracts as a reason to accelerate, not to wait. Kestrel continued its plan and announced it was evaluating the UK and Ireland for its business wallet. Tallis followed Oakmere's 5 basis point self-serve FX increase and made no other move. Market: 110 of the 300 accounts accepted contracts. Scoreboard: Oakmere 2027 EBITDA £31M (platform opex offsetting modest share gains); no share change of note elsewhere.
Round 2 (2028, inject: Tallis sale process). Brackenridge bid £216M for Tallis within the round, 20% above the indicative price, and stated in its move sheet that it would go to £234M if contested, because "Tallis is the only licensed SME lender with a modern stack in the two markets, and its loan book is worth more funded by our deposits than by anyone's warehouse". The Tallis team, however, wrote that the founders and management would accept a lower price from Oakmere in exchange for team retention, product continuity and a faster close, and asked Oakmere for a proposal; this was the second surprise, and nobody on the Oakmere team had considered that the target had preferences beyond price. Oakmere, playing Option B, declined to bid but proposed an embedded-lending partnership in which Tallis would lend to SMEs on Oakmere's platform; the Tallis team accepted it as a fallback if the sale failed. Kestrel confirmed its UK and Ireland launch for 2029. Market: contracted accounts rose to 240 of 300; the Market team reported that platform product heads liked a fixed rate with compliance included because it removed an internal argument between product and compliance teams. Scoreboard: Oakmere 2028 EBITDA £33M; Brackenridge acquired Tallis at £225M (Control adjudicated the auction at the midpoint of the two stated bids).
Desk variant, Option C: Oakmere bid for Tallis in Round 1 at £180M; Brackenridge counter-bid at £225M in Round 2; Oakmere either lost the asset or paid £225M, at which price the 2029 cash return (Tallis's £14M of 2029 EBITDA plus its £12M share of synergies, against the price) fell from 14.4% to 11.6%, below the 12% cost of capital. Net debt after the deal at £195M would have been 4.4x pre-synergy pro forma EBITDA of £44M, breaching the 3.5x covenant on completion, so the facility would not have funded it without another £45M of equity.
Round 3 (2029, injects: Kestrel launch at free plus 30 basis points below; bank-like rules; marketplace RFPs). Kestrel's pricing took 8% of self-serve volume from every account provider under the adjudication rule (6% for the FX gap, 2% for free domestic payments, under the 10% cap). For Oakmere on Option B, the exposure was limited to the 60 non-contracted top accounts (£28M of net revenue) and the self-serve long tail (£82M), £110M in all; the loss was £8.8M of net revenue and £6.0M of gross profit at the 68% margin, and Control added £1M of defensive marketing, for a £7M EBITDA hit, above the matrix estimate of £4M for Home Advantage because the Kestrel team also placed its wallet inside the two accounting-software platforms' app stores, its second move in the matrix. Brackenridge, now owning Tallis, launched its bundle at 15% below Oakmere's contract rate to the top 200 platforms; 40 of those were Oakmere contracted platforms and only 5 moved, at an average of £0.3M of net revenue each, costing £1M against the matrix estimate of £4M, because the contract rate plus compliance service scored higher on total cost with the Market team. The two damage figures together came to £8M, the same total as the matrix, for opposite reasons. The marketplace RFPs went to Oakmere (one) and Brackenridge (one); Kestrel did not qualify on the lending partner or the sub-merchant compliance attestation. Scoreboard: Oakmere 2029 EBITDA £36M, £8M below the no-response model value of £44M, in a world that had become Home Advantage.
Desk variant, Option A: Kestrel's pricing hit the full self-serve exposure of a standalone account model with nothing under contract; A lost 8% of £186M of exposed net revenue, £15M of revenue and £10M of EBITDA, against the no-response model value of £19M; the extra 120 staff could not counter free. Round 3 EBITDA under A: £7M in Home Advantage, far below the £25M floor the board had set for the 2030 liquidity event. Desk variant, Option C: the same pricing on the combined Oakmere, Tallis and Fernleigh self-serve base of £205M cost £16M of net revenue and £11M of EBITDA, taking C from £21M to £10M in Home Advantage with net debt of £150M.
Surprise log:
- Brackenridge treated Oakmere's platform contracts as a trigger to accelerate its entry into embedded SME payments (Round 1).
- Tallis's preference for a buyer offering team retention and product continuity over a higher-priced bank (Round 2), which created a low-cost option nobody had modelled.
- An embedded-lending partnership with Tallis was available to Oakmere under Option B without any acquisition debt (Round 2).
- Kestrel's pricing damaged the standalone account model (A) far more than the contracted platform model (B), by £10M against £7M, on a larger exposed base (Round 3).
- Platform product heads on the Market team valued the removal of an internal argument (fixed rate, compliance included) more than any unit price, a benefit that had not appeared in the option economics.
- Brackenridge's bundle moved only 5 of 40 contracted platforms (Round 3), suggesting the credible commitment of a three-year contract with compliance bundled works.
10. Payoff table and robustness verdict
2029 EBITDA in £M. The bracketed figure is the model value with no rival response; the unbracketed figure is after the rival responses observed in the game (Kestrel's pricing, Brackenridge's bundle and FX matching, Tallis's price following). Option C figures assume Oakmere wins Tallis at the £225M price the game produced, with the extra £45M funded as equity because the facility would not fund it.
| Option | Open Runway | Crowded Rails | Narrow Gate | Home Advantage | Worst | Max regret | Scenarios acceptable (floor: 2029 EBITDA of £25M, own funds at 120% of requirement, net debt under 3.5x) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A: Deepen the Core | 44 (46) | 28 (38) | 24 (27) | 7 (19) | 7 | 29 | 2 of 4 |
| B: Embedded Platform | 40 (42) | 38 (45) | 44 (47) | 36 (44) | 36 | 22 | 4 of 4 |
| C: Acquire and Lend | 62 (64) | 54 (63) | 20 (22) | 10 (21) | 10 | 26 | 2 of 4 |
How the no-response figures bridge across the axis: the bank-like cells cost each option the £19M described in section 4 against the matching proportionate cell (A: £46M to £27M; B: £42M to £47M after £24M of platform gains from compliance outsourcing, 32 additional platform contracts at £1.1M of net revenue each at the 68% margin; C: £64M to £22M after a further £5M of compliance and interchange cost at Tallis and Fernleigh, £9M of net lending revenue lost as the loan book shrinks by a third under the capital rules, and £9M of the £16M synergies not captured because integration is consumed by the regulatory programme). In Home Advantage the same bridge runs from the Crowded Rails column, with B's platform gains at £18M (24 contracts) because incumbents contest the platforms.
Regret arithmetic: best in each scenario is 62 (C), 54 (C), 44 (B), 36 (B). A's regrets are 18, 26, 20, 29; B's are 22, 16, 0, 0; C's are 0, 0, 24, 26. Simple averages across the four scenarios: A £25.8M, B £39.5M, C £36.5M.
Downside against tolerance. B's worst case of £36M clears the £25M floor; own funds of £100M in 2029 (£70M today plus £30M retained after tax and platform investment, per the model) against a bank-like requirement of £60M (3% of £2,000M of outstanding e-money) is 167% cover, and the group stays debt-free. A's worst case of £7M is far below the floor, and its Narrow Gate case of £24M also misses it; own funds hold (£86M against £55.5M, 3% of £1,850M, 155%), but the growth investor's 2030 event is off. C's worst case of £10M with net debt of £150M is 15.0x, a default; its Narrow Gate case of £20M is 7.5x, a covenant breach; and in both bank-like cells the enlarged group's own funds (Oakmere's £70M plus Tallis's £12M, plus what little is retained) fall below the 120% floor (Narrow Gate: £87M against a requirement of £87M, 3% of £2,900M, needing a £17M injection to reach 120%; Home Advantage: £85M against £78M, 3% of £2,600M, needing £9M). The Round 2 desk variant showed that C's best cases depend on a purchase price that Brackenridge will not allow, at which the 11.6% return is already below the 12% cost of capital.
Classification. A is dominated: never best, unacceptable in two scenarios. C is a bet on Proportionate regulation: best in two scenarios by a wide margin, catastrophic in the other two, and its best cases depend on winning an auction against a rival with cheaper funding. B is the survivor: acceptable in all four, best in two, smallest maximum regret, and the only option whose worst case leaves the company debt-free and the 2030 liquidity event intact.
Verdict sentence: pursue Option B, staged over three years, unless the Tallis signposts (an adviser or an outside CEO appointed) or a Brackenridge fintech acquisition trip before December 2027, in which case exercise the Tallis right of first refusal negotiated now, funded within the 3.5x covenant and the 120% own-funds floor by deferring the second phase of the platform build one year.
11. Adaptive plan and hand-offs
No-regret moves now (good in every scenario): open contract negotiations with the top 300 accounts in the second quarter of 2027; certify integrations with the two leading accounting-software platforms; build the compliance and onboarding tooling first, because the safeguarding rules are predetermined and the tooling pays in every scenario; stop the self-serve price hold that Option A assumed.
Options to buy cheaply: negotiate a right of first refusal on Tallis Financial for £2M plus a team-retention commitment, using the Round 2 finding that the founders prefer a buyer offering continuity; offer Tallis an embedded-lending partnership as the fallback, which makes Tallis a complementor rather than a competitor in the Incumbents-enter scenarios.
Signpost-triggered decisions:
| Trigger | Date checked | Decision |
|---|---|---|
| Tallis appoints an adviser or an outside CEO, or Brackenridge announces a fintech acquisition | Monthly, through December 2027 | Exercise the Tallis right of first refusal; defer the second platform phase one year to stay under 3.5x and above 120% own-funds cover |
| Kestrel business-wallet signpost trips | Quarterly | Pull platform launch forward two quarters; extend contracts to accounts 301-600 |
| No regulation signpost and at most one incumbent-entry signpost above threshold at the December 2027 review | December 2027 | Cut platform scope from £30M to £18M and the total programme from £60M to £48M; keep the compliance tooling, which pays in every scenario |
| Two or more regulation signposts above threshold | Any quarterly review | Hold the full £60M programme; begin the own-funds build to 150% of the projected requirement; withdraw from the six self-serve micro-business segments with the lowest contribution |
Hand-offs: the adaptive plan and no-regret moves go to execution-planning for charters and RAPID; the signpost table goes to kpi-architecture as monitored measures with owners and cadence; the chosen option goes to a pre-mortem for the internal pre-mortem (platform delivery, regulatory approval of the compliance-as-a-service model, sales-force adoption of contracts), which this exercise deliberately did not cover; the payoff table, verdict sentence and surprise log go to executive-communication for the board paper.